We provide a methodology to estimate a global credit risk factor from CDS spreads that can be very useful for risk management. The global risk factor (GRF) reproduces quite well the different episodes that have affected the credit market over the sample period. It is highly correlated with standard credit indices, but it contains much higher explanatory power for fluctuations in CDS spreads across sectors than the credit indices themselves. The additional information content over iTraxx seems to be related to some financial interest r ates. We first use the estimated GRF to analyze the extent to which the eleven sectors we consider are systemic. After that, we use it to split the credit risk of individual issuers into systemic, sectorial, and idiosyncratic components, and we perform some analyses to test that the estimated idiosyncratic components are actually firm-specific. The systemic and sectorial components explain around 65% of credit risk in the European industrial and financial firms and 50% in the North American firms in those sectors, while 35% and 50% of risk, respectively, has an idiosyncratic nature. Thus, there is a significant margin for portfolio diversification. We also show that our decomposition allows us to identify those firms whose credit would be harder to hedge. We end up analyzing the relationship between the estimated components of risk and some synthetic risk factors, in order to learn about the different nature of the credit risk components.
INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis has shown the importance of determining the main influences and characteristics of sovereign and corporate credit markets. This has become a requirement for financial institutions, since the Basel III agreement emphasizes that the credit strategy of a financial institution must take into account the cyclical aspects of the economy and the resulting shifts in the composition and quality of the overall credit portfolio. The credit strategy should be viable in the long-run, through various economic cycles and changing economic conditions, and financial institutions must know the sensitivity of their credit portfolio to a wide variety of macroeconomic and financial indicators. Additionally, credit policies are required to ensure appropriate diversification at the portfolio level, and to have the ability to identify any particular sensitivities or concentrations [see BCBS (2000) ]. For that, a central issue is to have an estimate of the interrelations among industry sectors and, in particular, the degree to which credit risk in a given sector is of a systemic nature. Both issues: the sensitivity of credit risk to changing economic and financial conditions, and the evaluation of the systemic nature of sectorial credit risk, are examined in this paper.
Financial support by grants ECO2015-67305-P, PrometeoII/2013/015, Programa de Ayudas a la Investigación from Banco de España is gratefully acknowledged.This article is an enlarged version of Chapter 3 in A. Chamizo's doctoral disssertation, available at https://eprints.ucm.es/40767/1/T38233.pdf. It reflects the opinions of the authors, but not the opinion of BBVA.. The key lesson learned from this crisis is that financial institutions need to have a comprehensive risk appetite framework in place that helps them to better understand and manage their risks by translating risk metrics and methods into strategic decisions, reporting, and day-to-day business decisions [FBS (2013) and EBA (2014) ]. Our analysis provides an element for such a risk appetite framework.
By providing an estimate of the global risk factor, analyzing its determinants and using that factor to evaluate the systemic and the idiosyncratic components of risk, we describe an empirical framework that can be used by financial institutions to manage their risk. Indeed, by evaluating sectors with the most potential to produce systemic risk problems, our analysis should also be considered to be crucial for supervisors and regulators.
A crucial issue for asset allocation in the credit markets is the diversification of a credit portfolio.
Indeed, the sensitivity of each sector to the global risk factor will suggest to what extent the risk in a sectorial credit portfolio is systemic or idiosyncratic in nature. Especially important would be its application to the financial sector, to identify the systemic financial institutions. Besides, the sensitivity of credit risk from a particular sector or a geographic region to the global risk factor should help to take positions in anticipation of events affecting global risk and, in particular, to design an efficient hedge of a credit portfolio.
A sensible global credit risk factor could also be very useful when trying to anticipate the occurrence of a stress period in credit markets. Precisely, our analysis is a good starting point to evaluate credit risk exposures under stressful conditions, another requirement from Basel III. Stress testing should involve identifying possible events or future changes in economic conditions that could have unfavorable effects on a bank's credit exposures and also assessing the bank's ability to withstand such changes.
Three areas that banks could usefully examine are (i) economic or industry downturns; (ii) market-risk events; and (iii) liquidity conditions. The banks should attempt to identify the type of situations, such as economic downturns, both in the whole economy and in particular sectors, and the combinations of credit and market events, which could produce substantial losses. Besides evaluating the relevance of the systemic component of sectorial credit portfolios, and for estimating the sensitivity of sectorial indices to macroeconomic and financial indicators, we also use the global risk factor for stress testing global and sectorial credit portfolios.
We propose a simple methodology to estimate a global risk factor in credit markets from CDS spreads, as well as to advance in the characterization of its determinants. The most widely used measures of systemic risk are based on information on CDS spreads, which are forward-looking and reflect the market perception of the credit risk of the firm. We first construct sectorial credit indices from daily CDS spread data for individual firms in that sector. So, we pool together CDS data from firms in the same sector from different regions. This is a reasonable approach, since there is more similarity among CDS spreads from the same sector in different regions than among CDS spreads of different sectors in the same region. Then, we use a principal component analysis across sectorial indices to construct the global risk factor. The observed high commonality among sectorial indices suggests that SPLITTING CREDIT RISK INTO SYSTEMIC, SECTORIAL AND IDIOSYNCRATIC COMPONENTS 3 our proposed characterizations of a global risk factor is sensible. Our estimates are robust to alternative strategies for the estimation of sectorial credit indices. We show that well diversified CDS portfolios from a given sector have good possibilities for hedging by taking a contrary position in iTraxx or CDX indices or in their derivative products.
We use our global risk factor to decompose credit risk at the level of the firm into systemic, sectorial and idiosyncratic components. This decomposition of risk for the industrial and financial sectors points to relatively large idiosyncratic components of risk that are still larger in North American than in European firms, which may be due to a lack of liquidity. We provide evidence suggesting that portfolios made up of firms with higher idiosyncratic components are easier to hedge, contrary to what happens with portfolios made up of firms with lower idiosyncratic risk components. That is observed uniformly over the industrial and financial sectors of Europe and North America. Finally, we explore the nature of each estimated risk component by analyzing its sensitivity to some synthetic risk factors.
Our analysis provides an element for a risk appetite framework at financial institutions, since they could easily use the numerical estimates of risk components we propose to maintain their risk limits when taking their asset allocation decisions. Furthermore, by evaluating the firms and sectors with the most potential to produce systemic risk problems, our analysis should also be considered to be crucial for supervisors and regulators.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we review the most relevant literature on this topic. In Section 3 we describe our database for CDS spreads as well as for the financial and macroeconomic indicators that are used throughout the paper. In Section 4 we construct sectorial credit indices for all the sectors and examine their time evolution. We also estimate a global risk factor, and analyze its main characteristics. In Section 5 we decompose credit risk into systemic and idiosyncratic components at the level of the sectors. In Section 6 we decompose credit risk into systemic, sectorial and idiosyncratic components at the level of the firm for the industrial and financial sectors of Europe and North America and we examine the nature of each estimated risk component by analyzing their relationship with some synthetic risk factors. Finally, we conclude with a summary of the main findings.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Given the importance of the topic for researchers and market regulators after the financial crisis, the recent literature on measuring systemic risk has been quite extensive, and in this section we briefly review the papers we consider most relevant for our work.
A first strand of literature has considered the characterization of an indicator of systemic risk, with the principal component methodology playing a prominent role in that search. Using a sample of 150 European firms from January 2003 to July 2007, Berndt and Obreja (2010) show that the first principal component of CDS returns explained 46% of the variation in weekly CDS returns, even after correcting 4 SPLITTING CREDIT RISK INTO SYSTEMIC, SECTORIAL AND IDIOSYNCRATIC COMPONENTS for a market factor (weekly excess return on the MSCI Europe index) and a term premium, computed as the spread between the weekly return on the ten-year Euribor bond and the one-week Euribor. Chen and Härdle (2015) found that the first principal component for a set of eight iTraxx and CDX indices of 5-and 10-year maturities and investment grade and high-yield ratings explained 58.7% of the variance in the pre-crisis period, increasing up to 72.3% of the variance in the crisis period, but only 47% in the post-crisis period. They also concluded that a four-factor model could provide a good fit to weekly changes in CDS indices, with all factors receiving a significant market price. Bhansali et al. (2008) also use a three-jump model, and a different dataset from ours to carry out a decomposition of CDS spreads among systemic risk, sectorial risk and idiosyncratic risk. Duellmann and Masschelein (2007) used the analytic version of the analytic value-at-risk approximation developed by Pykhtin (2004) which only requires risk parameters on a sector level. This approach is applied to measure the impact of credit concentrations in business sectors on the economic capital of credit portfolios. The sector composition of the portfolios is based on credit information from the German central credit register.
Most of the literature on this type of decomposition has focused on the financial sector, at firm level. (2013) Giglio (2010) showed that the upturn in bond yields and CDS spreads of financial institutions during the crisis reflected increases in idiosyncratic default risk rather than systemic risk. This was the case for the months before the Bear Stearns episode in March 15, 2008, and also after Lehman's default. Hammoudeh et al. (2013) examined the behavior of the US 5-year sector CDS spread indices for banking, the financial services and the insurance sector over the period January 2004 to March 2009, suggesting the existence of an important systemic component of credit risk in the three sectors. Puzanova and Düllmann (2013) present an approach for measuring systemic risk and decomposing it into the contributions of individual institutions. To assess the system-wide loss, they modeled a banking sector as a portfolio comprising banks' net of capital liabilities, using a widely used credit risk model to assess the tail risk of such a portfolio. The model inputs were the banks' individual probabilities of default, the size of their net of capital liabilities and the banks' sensitivity to systemic factors, which capture correlations between banks' asset returns. Eder and Keiler (2015) estimated the degree of systemic risk and the magnitude of risk spillover effects by introducing a specific weighting scheme in a regression that relates observations to each other. They measure contagion effects in CDS levels as well as CDS changes. Their methodology allows for a decomposition of the total risk charge into a systemic, SPLITTING CREDIT RISK INTO SYSTEMIC, SECTORIAL AND IDIOSYNCRATIC COMPONENTS 5 systemic and idiosyncratic risk charge. They found considerable spillovers of risk due to the interconnectedness of the systemically important banks and insurance companies in their sample. Depending on the state of the economy, up to a fifth of the total predicted CDS spread changes were due to financial infection, highlighting the need for macro-prudential supervision and serving as an alternative explanation for the nonlinear relationship between a debtor's theoretical probability of default and observed credit spreads. The decomposition of risk into its systemic and idiosyncratic components has also been extensively studied for sovereign CDS markets, but we do not review it here. (Heitfield et al., 2006) examine the influence of systematic and idiosyncratic risk on credit losses for portfolios of large wholesale bank loans. They concluded that the relative importance of expected loss, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk varies considerably from sector-to-sector and is sensitive to the distribution of exposures within a given portfolio.
Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña
Other important contributions to the literature have examined the relevance of systemic risk in sovereign credit, using CDS spreads. Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) studied the relative importance of country-specific and global factors on sovereign debt prices for a set of 31 emerging market countries from 1994 to 2007, to find that country-specific fundamentals have substantial explanatory power, even after controlling for global factors. Longstaff et al. (2011) found that sovereign credit risk tends to be much more correlated across countries than are equity index returns for the same countries. Their outcome suggested that the source of these higher correlations is the dependence of sovereign credit spreads on a common set of global market factors, risk premiums, and liquidity patterns. Badaoui et al. (2013) applied a factor model to decompose sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) spreads into default, liquidity, systemic liquidity and correlation components. Their analysis shows that sovereign CDS spreads were highly driven by liquidity, while sovereign bond spreads are less subject to liquidity frictions and therefore could represent a better proxy for sovereign default risk. Finally, their empirical results suggested that the increase in the CDS spreads observed during the crisis period was mainly due to a surge in liquidity rather than to an increase in the default intensity. Heinz and Sun (2014) found that European countries' sovereign CDS spreads are largely driven by global investor sentiment, macroeconomic fundamentals and liquidity conditions, even though the relative importance of these factors changed over time.
In terms of the determinants of risk, Berndt and Obreja (2010) and Chen and Härdle (2015) try to characterize the most influential financial variables that explain credit spread movements by analyzing the impact of some financial variables on individual CDS spreads and CDS indices, respectively.
Much of this literature has focused on individual firm data, using accounting data and firm's characteristics as indicators of credit risk. Often, the goal has been to explain default rates. Our objective is somewhat different, as we use a wide set of macroeconomic and financial variables to explain the time evolution of corporate sector CDS indices according to the Industry Classification Benchmark. 
THE DATA
We have used the database provided by Markit, the main supplier of CDS prices [Markit (2008) and Markit (2012) ]. We selected the fields: ticker, tier, spread, sector and region. The 'Ticker' field gives information on the key name of the firm. 'Tier' contains the type of debt to be delivered in the event of All these prices are composite, which means that for a given restructuring event, firm and currency, they are the average of prices provided by different financial institutions. The 'Sector' field is based on the ICB classification, (Industry Classification Benchmark), which distinguishes four levels: Industry, Supra Sector, Sector, and Subsector. We work at Markit industry level, which considers 11 industries: energy, basic materials, industrials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care, financials, technology, telecommunication services, utilities, and government. 1 Finally, Markit considers 13 different regions: Africa, Asia, Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Europe, India, Latin America, Middle East, North America, Oceania, OffShore, Pacific and Supranational.
We consider the data on 5-year CDS trading of senior unsecured debt, SNRFOR, with 2,608 daily observations between January 2006 and December 2015 on approximately 2,500 firms from the 11 mentioned industries and the 13 geographical areas. We select the 760 firms having daily quotes on their 5-year CDS without having been subject to a merger or acquisition. Most of the CDSs have ratings "BBB" or "A". The best represented sectors are financials, consumer services and industrials, while the main regions are North America, Europe, and Asia. These distributions are relatively stable over time.
To derive a fundamental interpretation of some of the estimates we compute throughout the paper, we will use a wide set of daily indicators from the Bloomberg database. For the purpose of interpreting our results, we classify them as pure financial indicators, equity indicators, risk aversion indicators and indicators bearing some relationship with macroeconomic or monetary policy. Some of the relationships of credit spreads with financial market indicators may be short-lived, and they may be lost if we aggregate to monthly frequencies. It will clearly be interesting to analyze the relationship with 1 Government is a category considered by Markit but not included in the Industry Classification Benchmark. Risk aversion indicators: 23) Euro liquidity premium, measured by the absolute difference between three-month EURIBOR and three-month EONIA, both in euros, 24) USD liquidity risk premium, measured by the absolute difference between three-month LIBOR and the three-month OIS Index, 25) three-month five-year USD swaption, 26) three-month five-year Euro swaption, 27) the VIX Volatility Index, from CBOE, as market expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices, 28) the VSTOXX Index, as implied volatility in EURO STOXX 50 real-time option prices, 29) implied volatility from option prices for the three-month euro-dollar exchange rate, 30) implied volatility from the 3-month ATM iTraxx Europe Index options, 31) implied volatility from the 3-month ATM CDX North American Investment Grade Index Option. 2 Macroeconomic indicators: 32) euro-dollar exchange rate, 33) 5-year German government yield, 34) yield on 10-year German government bond, 35) 5-year US Treasury Rate, 36) yield on 10-year US Treasury, 37) the 10-year yield on Japan government debt, 38-40) term structure slope, defined as the 10-year, 1-year rates spread, r t,10 − r t,1 , in swap rates in US dollar, euro, and yen, 41-43) term structure curvature, defined as r t,10 − 2r t,5 + r t,1 , from swap rates in US dollar, euro and yen.
EXAMINING THE HISTORIC DATA
4.1. Sectorial indices . We construct daily CDS indices for each sector by taking the median CDS spread traded each day in that sector across all firms in all regions, as shown in Figure 4 Table 1 ). The higher volatility is achieved by weekly changes in spreads from telecommunication services and the government sector. Interestingly enough, all sectors display right skewness, while kurtosis is particularly high in the financial, government, health care and utilities sectors. As a consequence, the assumption of normality as the distribution of weekly changes in CDS spreads is overwhelmingly rejected in all sectors.
The time evolution of the sectorial indices shows the main market events that took place during the sample period. New Century Financial, largest U.S. subprime lender, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, announcing the departure of more than half the workforce as of 2 April 2007, with no apparent impact on CDS spreads. Even more surprisingly, CDS spreads barely increased at the time of the Bear Sterns crisis in July 2007. However, the market was accumulating fears on the situation of credit. The origin of the financial crisis may be placed on August 9, 2007, with BNP Paribas announcing that it was ceasing activity in three hedge funds that specialized in US mortgage debt. The announcement acted as a signal that there were tens of trillions of US dollar worth of derivatives which were worth much less than previously estimated. Since nobody knew the exposure of individual banks to these toxic assets, trust evaporated overnight and banks stopped doing business with each other. The perception of risk spread over all sectors, which explains the simultaneous increase shown in suggesting that they might be the less systemic sectors. The high overall correlations reflect the existence of at least a common factor, while the lower association between the health care and technology sectors and all the others must be due to the existence of specific factors explaining fluctuations in CDS prices in these two sectors. On the other hand, no single sector seems to be dominant, in the sense of having higher correlations with all the other sectors. Since any estimate of a global risk factor should avoid embedding idiosyncratic elements, and these are present in the successive principal components, we decide to stick to just the first principal component as the estimate of a latent global credit risk factor, capturing two thirds of the variance in the set of eleven sectorial credit indices. 4 By construction, such a risk factor uses information on the set of CDS spreads trading at each point in time for all firms in the different sectors in all regions.
The evolution of the explanatory power of the principal components throughout the sample gives us an estimate of the way the degree of commonality has evolved over time. In so far as the effects of the financial and economic crisis were felt over the whole economy, we should expect to see the common factors increasing relevance in that period of time, dominating sector-specific risk elements. To check that hypothesis, we follow Eichengreen et al. (2012) It is interesting to note that the government sector seems to have a strong specific behavior that explains its association with the second principal component in spite of having a loading in the first component in line with that of the other sectors. and 5 show similar information when the Global risk factor is the explanatory variable. Column 6 shows the R2 from a regression on a set of financial indicators described in the paper. Columns 7 to 9 show R2 from regressions on the sectorial MSCI index, that index together with iTraxx, and the MSCI sectorial index together with the global risk factor (GRF). An important question for risk management would relate to the performance of a hedging strategy for a CDS position in a given sector, based on taking a contrary position in the iTraxx Index, using the least-squares estimate of beta for that sector. Except for a constant, the residuals from these regressions would be the returns on the hedged portfolio, and the R-squared statistics show the reduction achieved by the hedge on the variance of the sector portfolio. With the exception of health care and technology sectors, hedging efficiency would be significant, with a substantial reduction in sectorial credit index variance, between 32% and 53%, which shows an interesting potential for hedging credit portfolios when they are sufficiently diversified in a given sector. Table 3 contain betas and R-squared statistics from regressions explaining sectorial credit indices with the global risk factor estimated in the previous sector as the single explanatory variable. The fact that the global risk factor contains a good deal of information on fluctuations in sectorial CDS returns is to be expected, but it is surprising that it contains so much more explanatory power than credit market indices like iTraxx. The median R-squared is 0.70 for the global risk factor and 0.39 for the iTraxx index. Its high information content may arise because by averaging CDS spreads over the sectors, the first principal component incorporates some aspects of the credit market that might be sector specific and not incorporated in standard credit indices. Furthermore, the iTraxx may contain some idiosyncratic component unrelated to any specific sector, as reflected in the fact that it often presents deviations from the theoretical price that could be estimated from prices for its constituents, which could weaken its correlation with the sectorial credit indices. The high explanatory power on CDS issues from all sectors and geographical areas also justifies the interpretation of the first principal component as representing a global risk factor. Even if we estimate a regression to explain sectorial credit indices using all the indicators described in section 3. 5 R-squared statistics do not reach the explanatory power attained by the global risk factor (column 6). Incidentally, augmented
Dickey-Fuller statistics for the residuals from regressions of sectorial indices either on iTraxx or on the global risk factor overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in all sectors. That means that both sets of regressions can be interpreted as cointegrating regressions, with sectorial indices sharing the same stochastic trends as iTraxx or the global risk factor, differences between them being short-lived. 6 It also means that the use of either iTraxx or the global risk factor to explain or possibly predict sectorial indices should be done through an error correction model. However, the difference in R-squared statistics means that the global risk factor tracks sectorial indices much better than the iTraxx index.
It is also interesting to see that the MSCI stock indices contain significant information on sectorial credit indices (column 7), with a median R-squared of 0.34, showing that credit spreads react to events in the stock markets. When we add the iTraxx index to the set of sectorial MSCI indices (column 8), Rsquared values suggest that there is some information in MSCI indices that is not captured by iTraxx.
It is striking that our estimated global risk factor seems to incorporate the information contained in MSCI indices on the credit market, the MSCI indices not adding any information content to the global risk factor to explain the sectorial credit indices.
4.4. The differential information contained in the global risk factor. We have already seen that the GRF contains a significant amount of information beyond that contained in a credit index like iTraxx.
Explaining sectorial credit indices with the GRF yield R-squared statistics up to twice as high as those
obtained when we explain the sectorial indices with iTraxx, even though the time profiles of both 5
In consistency with the credit data, we use the financial and macroeconomic indicators in weekly differences. Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics, calculated with four lags to eliminate residual autocorrelation in the unit root regressions, give values between -4.42 and -12.10 suggesting that weekly changes for all the indicators are stationary. 6 One-lag augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics for the residuals fall between -11.3 and -16.9 for regressions on iTraxx, and between -12.5 and -18.1 for regressions on our estimated global risk factor. indices is quite similar. Figure 4 .3 shows that the weekly differences in both indices are less than perfectly correlated. Full-sample correlation is, in fact, 0.68. What disparate information is contained in the global risk factor? A first piece of evidence comes from the last regression in Table 3 that adds the global risk factor to the MSCI indices to explain sectorial indices. We obtain the same fit as with the global risk factor alone, showing that that the global risk factor embeds all the information provided by MSCI indices on sectorial risk credit. That is one difference in the information content between iTraxx and the global risk factor. Such residuals give us the component of our estimated global risk factor that is uncorrelated with iTraxx. Thus, if we now correlate those residuals with the macroeconomic and financial indicators, we can have some idea of what type of information is captured by the GRF that is not in iTraxx. Considering the correlations higher than 0.20 in absolute value, this analysis shows a negative association between that component of the global risk factor and three financial variables: the spread of the 3-month Libor rate over the USD Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) (libor_ovn,(-)) (correlation sign shown in parenthesis), the 1-year euro swap rate (-), and the 1-year US swap rate (ussw1,(-)). Being a global index, it also presents a positive correlation with two credit indices, the Japanese iTraxx index (itraxxJ,(+)), and the high yield CDX index (cdxhy,(+)). Finally, it has negative correlation with all MSCI indices, being above 0.20 with the materials, industrials, telecommunications and financial MSCI indices. Correlation signs are the same as those obtained for the global risk factor and these same indicators. This means that the global risk factor contains information on these indicators beyond the correlation shown by the iTraxx index. 
SYSTEMIC AND IDIOSYNCRATIC COMPONENTS OF CREDIT RISK IN SECTORIAL PORTFOLIOS
We have proposed a simple method to estimate a global credit risk factor. The estimate uses CDS data, so it captures only events that have a reflection on CDS spreads, and we have shown that it has a high explanatory power on the time behavior of sectorial credit indices. Hence, the sectors with more important systemic risk will be those whose index moves closer to the global credit risk factor. Table 3 shows that the global risk factor has an R-squared above 70% over the whole period 2006-2015 for a number of sectorial indices. The appearance of the financial sector in this group is in line with the remarks made in Moody's (Munves (2008) ) and Basel BCBS (2011) Along the same line of reasoning, health care and technology would be the two least systemic sectors, in consistency with their lower correlations with other sectorial indices that we already saw in Table 3 .2. The systemic nature of the health care sector is not surprising, taking into account the robust growth that it is experiencing around the world. This is especially the case in the developed countries (which represent the major part of our data sample) as the population of these countries is getting older, with more economic resources and a greater demand for health care services so as to achieve a better quality of life. As a consequence, the health care sector has been less influenced by the recent crisis. The specific nature of innovation in this industry, which has a life cycle very different from the other sectors of the economy, may explain the characterization of the technology sector as being less systemic than the rest. That correlation was set at 30%, up from the previous value of 24%, while the 24% correlation was kept for the rest of corporate sectors.
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We could think of the residuals in the regressions of sectorial credit indices on the global risk factor as being the idiosyncratic component of credit risk in each sector. A perfectly adequate credit risk factor would capture all the commonality across sectors and hence, the residuals should be sectorspecific, with low correlations between them, in the spirit of idiosyncratic components. Indeed, the median absolute correlation between the residuals for any two sectors is just 0.094. Being small, it is less than fully satisfactory, because it means that about half of the 55 correlations between sectorial idiosyncratic components are statistically significant, but the highest correlation is 0.29, and the 90% percentil is just 0.21. These correlations suggest that there might be some additional common element among the sectorial credit indices that is not captured by the global risk factor, although its explanatory power does not seem to be too large. 
DECOMPOSITION OF RISK AT THE LEVEL OF THE FIRM: SYSTEMIC, SECTORIAL AND IDIOSYNCRATIC

RISKS
In the previous section we have analyzed the nature of credit risk in sectorial portfolios. Such information is needed for a rigorous asset allocation of credit among sectors. We now come down to the analysis of the characteristics of risk in some specific sectors, which should be the guide for asset allocation decisions inside a given sector. We want to measure to what extent firms in the sector are subject to systemic risk as well as to sectorial risk and what the relevance of idiosyncratic risk is. We count as systemic risk events that have influence across the global credit markets. By sectorial risk we understand events that affect all firms in the sector, with no essential effect elsewhere. The idiosyncratic component of risk is obtained as the residual of each firm's CDS return after extracting the systemic and sectorial components of risk. Such evaluation of the relevance of risk components has obvious implications on the asset allocation strategy by a given financial institution that wants to diversify its credit portfolio in that sector. In designing their credit policy, financial institutions should avoid firms with a large systemic risk component in favor of those with larger idiosyncratic risk components, always trying to form sufficiently diversified portfolios. As a byproduct, we also want to analyze whether the risk structure is common to a given sector in different geographical areas, such as the financial sectors of Europe and North America. That might suggest that sectorial characteristics are possibly more important than geographical characteristics in determining CDS spreads.
To estimate the systemic component of risk we will use the same approach as with the sectorial indices: we estimate a regression of the CDS spread for each firm on the global risk factor that we ote: Colum1 shows the company name from Markit database. Column 2 displays the adjusted R-squared from a regression on the Global risk factor, which we take as a measure of the relevance of the systemic component. Column 3 shows the R-squared from a regression on the sectorial index. Column 4 shows the R-squared from a regression on both indices. The relevance of the sectorial componnet of risk is obatined as the difference between columns 4 and 2. The relevance of the idiosyncratic component of risk is obtained as 1 minus the R-squared in column 4. Bold figures indicate the most important factor the risk decomposition for each firm.
North American financial and industrial sectors. In terms of median R-squared values across
North American financial firms, the systemic factor accounts for 38% of total CDS return risk, sectorial factors explain 12%, and firm-specific factors explain the largest amount, 48% of total CDS risk [ Table   6 ]. Thus, 50% of the credit risk in these firms has a systemic or sectorial nature, the other 50% being idiosyncratic, which leaves significant possibilities for portfolio diversification. These figures are very similar to those we obtained for the North American industrial sector. This result once more suggests the difficulty in finding a successful hedge for undiversified positions in CDS from these firms, which might possibly be explained by the lack of liquidity of the CDS market. The bottom line of this analysis is that we can indeed use the principal component methodology with data from a given geographical region to extract a sectorial component of risk that turns out to be similar to the sectorial credit index that can be obtained from all CDS trading in all regions. Our construction of the global sector factor is not directly responsible for this result. In fact, choosing the median of all CDS spreads traded each day over the world does not seem to be the most direct way to generate a high correlation with an average of sector spreads in a specific region. The implications are important. They suggest that the first intrasector principal component across firms is essentially free of firm idiosyncratic characteristics, thereby justifying our estimates of sectorial components of risk.
The second issue relates to whether our estimates of the idiosyncratic components of risk have the appropriate features. First of all, our estimates of the idiosyncratic components of risk turn out to be essentially uncorrelated across firms, which is a necessary condition for the interpretation we give 8 Incidentally, remember that the financial sector credit index is the same for European and North American firms. The composition of these groups of indicators is specified in Section 3 except that, to avoid excessive collinearity among the synthetic factors, we exclude the 5-and 10-year government rates from the set of macroeconomic factors, which ends up containing the euro-dollar and yen-dollar exchange rates together with the slope and curvature of the term structure in euros, US dollars, and yens. ViTraxx and VCDX, have a lower correlation, of 0.67. Correlations between weekly changes in the ten sectorial MSIC indices fall between 0.54 and 0.93, with a median correlation of 0.75.
To avoid collinearity and to exploit optimally this common information, we obtain synthetic indicators by taking principal components in each group of indicators with the hope of explaining around 80% of the fluctuation in the whole group. A single principal component is enough among the set of MSCI indices, while two principal components are needed among the risk aversion, macro, interest rate, and financial indicators. However, the second principal components of each group do not add any explanatory power for GRF. The only exception is the second principal component for the financial indicators, which contributes with additional information to explain GRF. That synthetic indicator is an average of the 1-, 5-and 10-year US swap rates, so that it can be interpreted as the general level of medium-and long-term interest rates in the US. In fact, the first principal component of this subset of indicators, which is a broad average of interest rates across the three areas we have considered: eurozone, US and Japan, does not add information content to the other factors to explain the GRF. The synthetic equity indicator has a correlation above 0.75 with all sectorial MSCI indices except healthcare, so that it captures the general evolution of stock prices.
Interestingly enough, the risk indicator shows the highest correlation with swaption implied volatilities, both in euros and US dollars, even more than with stock market, credit or exchange rate volatility.
Thus, swaption-implied volatility seems to be dominant among the set of risk indicators. The macro synthetic indicator essentially captures a positive dependence from the slopes of the US and euro term structures and a negative dependence from their term structure curvature. The interest rate indicator is an approximate average of the 3-month euro rate and the Eonia rate. Finally, the synthetic financial indicator essentially captures risk in medium-and long-term US interest rates.
For each firm in a given sector, we estimate a regression explaining weekly variations in CDS spreads using the synthetic factors described above. To make coefficient estimates comparable, we have standardized the synthetic indicators by subtracting their sample mean and dividing by their standard deviation. The regressions provide us with beta estimates for each firm on the five synthetic factors: equity, macroeconomic, risk aversion, interest rates and financial. In the four sectors considered, the coefficients on the equity, risk aversion and interest rates factors are negative, while those in the macroeconomic and financial factors are positive. Then, we calculate for each factor the correlation, across the firms in a given sector, between the absolute values of the estimated betas for that factor and our estimates of the relevance of each type of risk, with the results shown in Table 9 . 10 10 With samples between 26 and 52 firms in each sector, statistical significance would require correlation coefficients above 0.30 in absolute value. Systemic firms should be expected to react to events affecting the global situation of the economy.
Indeed, we obtain that CDS spreads from firms with higher systemic risk have a higher sensitivity to stock market prices, to the perception of future risk as captured by implied volatilities, and to the slope of the term structure, which is known to be a good indicator of future business cycle events. These are correlations with the estimated factor sensitivity, they are not correlations with the synthetic risk factors. Hence, the negative correlation across firms between the relevance of idiosyncratic risk and the equity, macroeconomic, and risk aversion factors means that the more idiosyncratic the firm, the less responsive it is to changes in these synthetic factors, as expected. Firms with a high sectorial component of risk have a pattern of sensitivities to the synthetic factors similar to those of the more systemic firms although, as shown in Tables 4 to 7, the sectorial component of risk is usually not too important.
CONCLUSIONS
Whether or not the failure of a single firm evolves into a systemic crisis depends on the relevance of each firm in a given sector, as well as on the relevance of each sector in the global economy. In this paper we have advanced a decomposition of credit risk at the level of individual firms among systemic, sectorial and idiosyncratic components. At the level of sectors we have decomposed risk into a systemic and an idiosyncratic component. Decomposition of risk into systematic sectorial and idiosyncratic factors is very useful because of the large-portfolio properties of idiosyncratic risk. As a portfolio becomes more granular, idiosyncratic risk is diversified away at the portfolio level. In the SPLITTING CREDIT RISK INTO SYSTEMIC, SECTORIAL AND IDIOSYNCRATIC COMPONENTS 29 limit, when a portfolio becomes "infinitely fine-grained," idiosyncratic risk vanishes at the portfolio level, and only systematic and sectorial risk remains.
We have started by estimating a global risk factor. The information provided by this analysis has helped us to implement the risk decompositions mentioned above. We have identified the consumer goods and industrial sectors as being the most systemic. Health care and technology are the sectors displaying a higher idiosyncratic component of risk and therefore, a lower correlation with all the other sectors. We have shown that well diversified credit portfolios with CDSs from a given sector have good possibilities for hedging by taking a contrary position in iTraxx or CDX indices or in their derivative products. The systemic and sectorial components explain around 65% of credit risk in the European industrial and financial firms, and 50% in the North American firms of those sectors, with 35% and 50% of credit risk, respectively, being idiosyncratic, which leaves a significant margin for portfolio diversification. The fact that idiosyncratic components of risk are larger in North American than in European firms may be due to a lack of liquidity.
Our analysis provides an element for a risk appetite framework at financial institutions, since they could easily use the numerical estimates of risk components we propose to maintain their risk limits when taking their asset allocation decisions. Indeed, we have shown evidence suggesting that portfolios made up of firms with higher idiosyncratic components are easier to hedge, contrary to what happens with portfolios made up of firms with lower idiosyncratic risk components. This is observed uniformly over the industrial and financial sectors of Europe and North America. Furthermore, by evaluating the firms and sectors with the most potential to produce systemic risk problems, our analysis should also be considered to be crucial for supervisors and regulators. Finally, we explore the nature of each estimated risk component by analyzing its sensitivity to some synthetic risk factors. We have shown systemic firms to react to events affecting the global situation of the economy, having a higher sensititivy to risk factors based on stock market prices, the perception of future risk as captured by implied volatilities, or some business cycle indicators. We have also shown that the more idiosyncratic the firm, the less responsive it is to changes in these global factors. Both results support our decomposition of credit risk.
Additionally, our analysis has clear implications for credit risk management, since the sectorial strategy should depend on the risk decomposition of firms in a given sector. Indeed, it would seem appropriate to impose a maximum exposure to sectors where firms have a large systematic risk component while being relatively flexible about the distribution inside the sector, since a small idiosyncratic component would not allow us to extract the benefits of diversification by increasing the number of firms in the portfolio. On the contrary, in a sector where firms have large idiosyncratic risk component, we should avoid having a high name concentration, since a better diversification would reduce the total risk of the portfolio.
